The primary theme of this investigation is a deci sion theoretic account of conditional ought statements (e.g., "You ought to do A, if C") that rectifies glaring deficiencies in classical deontic logic. The resulting ac count forms a sound basis for qualitative decision the ory, thus providing a framework for qualitative plan ning under uncertainty. In particular, we show that adding causal relationships (in the form of a single graph) as part of an epistemic state is sufficient to facilitate the analysis of action sequences, their conse quences, their interaction with observations, their ex pected utilities and, hence, the synthesis of plans and strategies under uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
In natural discourse, "ought" statements reflect two kinds of considerations: requirements to act in ac cordance with moral convictions or peer's expecta tions, and requirements to act in the interest of one's survival, namely, to avoid danger and pursue safety. Statements of the second variety are natural candi dates for decision theoretic analysis, albeit qualitative in nature, and these will be the focus of our discus sion. The idea is simple. A sentence of the form "You ought to do A if C" is interpreted as shorthand for a more elaborate sentence: "If you observe, be lieve, or know C, then the expected utility resulting from doing A is much higher than that resulting from not doing A". 1 The longer sentence combines several modalities that have been the subjects of AI investiga tions: observation, belief, knowledge, probability ("ex pected"), desirability ("utility"), causation ("resulting from"), and, of course, action ("doing A"). With the exception of utility, these modalities have been for mulated recently using qualitative, order-of-magnitude abstractions of probability theory (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992 , Goldszmidt 1992 . Utility preferences them-selves, we know from decision theory, can be fairly unstructured, save for obeying asymmetry and tran sitivity. Thus, paralleling the order-of-magnitude ab straction of probabilities, it is reasonable to score con sequences on an integer scale of utility: very desirable (U = 0(1/t)), very undesirable (U = -0(1/t)), bear able (U = 0(1)), and so on, mapping each linguistic assessment into the appropriate t 0(1/ti) utility rat ing. This utility rating, when combined with the in finitesimal rating of probabilistic beliefs (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992) , should permit us to rate actions by the expected utility of their consequences, and a require ment to do A would then be asserted iff the rating of doing A is substantially (i.e., a factor of 1/t) higher than that of not doing A.
This decision theoretic agenda, although conceptually straightforward, encounters some subtle difficulties in practice. First, when we deal with actions and conse quences, we must resort to causal knowledge of the do main and we must decide how such knowledge is to be encoded, organized, and utilized. Second, while theo ries of actions are normally formulated as theories of temporal changes (Shoham 1988 , Dean & Kanazawa 1989 , ought statements invariably suppress explicit references to time, strongly suggesting that temporal information is redundant, namely, it can be recon structed if required, but glossed over otherwise. In other words, the fact that people comprehend, evalu ate and follow non-temporal ought statements suggests that people adhere to some canonical, yet implicit as sumptions about temporal progression of events, and that no account can be complete without making these assumptions explicit. Third, actions in decision theory predesignated explicitly to a few distinguished atomic variables, while statements of the type "You ought to do A" are presumed applicable to any arbitrary propo sition A.2 Finally, decision theoretic methods, espe cially those based on static infl uence diagrams, treat both the informational relationships between observa tions and actions and the causal relationships between actions and consequences as instantaneous (Chapter 6, Shachter 1986 , Pearl 1988 . In reality, the effect of 2This has been an overriding assumption in both the deontic logic and the preference logiC literatures.
our next action might be to invalidate currently ob served properties, hence any non-temporal account of ought must carefully distinguish properties that are infl uenced by the action from those that will persist despite the action, and must explicate therefore some canonical assumptions about persistence.
These issues are the primary focus of this paper. We start by presenting a brief introduction to infinites imal probabilities and showing how actions, beliefs, and causal relationships are represented by ranking functions �e(w) and causal networks r (Section 2). In Section 3 we present a summary of the formal results obtained in this paper, including an assertability crite rion for conditional oughts. Sections 4 and 5 explicate the assumptions leading to the criterion presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce an integer-valued utility ranking JJ(w) and show how the three compo nents, �e(w), r, and J.t(w), permit us to calculate, semi qualitatively, the utility of an arbitrary proposition <p, the utility of a given action A, and whether we ought to do A. Section 5 introduces conditional oughts, namely, statements in which the action is contingent upon ob serving a condition C. A calculus is then developed for transforming the conditional ranking �e(wiC) into a new ranking KA(wiC), representing the beliefs an agent will possess after implementing action A, hav ing observed C. These two ranking functions are then combined with J.t(w) to form an assertability criterion for the conditional statement O(AIC): "We ought to do A, given C". In Section 6 we compare our formu lation to other accounts of ought statements, in par ticular deontic logic, preference logic, counterfactual conditionals, and quantitative decision theory. 
(Ranking Functions).
Let !1 be a set of worlds, each world w E !1 being a truth-value assignment to a fi nite set of atomic variables (X1, X2, ... , Xn) which in this paper we assume to be hi-valued, namely, X; E {true, false}. A belief ranking function �e(w) is an assignment of non-negative integers to the ele ments of !1 such that �e(w) = 0 for at least one wE !1. Intuitively, �e(w) represents the degree of surprise asso ciated with fi nding a world w realized, and worlds as signed 11: = 0 are considered serious possibilities. �e(w) can be considered an order-of-magnitude approxima tion of a probability function P(w) by writing P(w) as a polynomial of some small quantity f and taking the most significant term of that polynomial, i.e.,
Treating f as an infinitesimal quantity induces a condi tional ranking function �e(<pl'l/>) on propositions which is governed by Spohn's calculus (Spohn 1988) : Thus, the new parent set of X; is pai = pa; U {DO;} and it is related to X; by �e(X;(w)lpai(w)) = oo if DO;= do(y) and X;(w) f. y { �e(X;(w)lpa;(w)) if DO;= idle 0 if DO;= do(y) and X;(w) = y (4)
The effect of performing action do(x;) is to transform �e(w) into a new belief ranking, �e.,,(w), given by
where �e' is the ranking dictated by the augmented network r U {DO;____. X;} and Eqs. (3) and (4).
This representation embodies the following aspects of actions:
(i) An action do(xi) can affect only the descendants of X; in r.
(ii) Fixing the value of pa ; (by some appropriate choice of actions) renders X; unaffected by any external intervention do(x"'), 1e f. i.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The assertability condition we are about to develop in this paper requires the specification of an epistemic state ES = (K(w), r, p(w)) which consists of three components:
ii:( w) -an ordinal belief ranking function on n. f -a causal network of K(w). p(w) -an integer-valued utility ranking of worlds, where p(w) ="± i assigns to w a utility U(w) ="± 0(1/E1), i = 0, 1, 2, ....
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. Let W/ and W ; -be the formulas whose models receive utility ranking + i and -i, respectively, and let K1(w) denote the ranking function that prevails after establishing the truth of event r.p, where r.p is an arbi trary proposition (i.e., K'(...., r.p) = oo and K1(r.p) = 0).
The expected utility rank of r.p is characterized by two integers
and is given by
where A and C are arbitrary propositions and the ranking KA(wjC) (to be defined in step 3) represents the beliefs that an agent anticipates holding, after im plementing action A, having observed C.
If
A is a conjunction of atomic propositions, A = 1\jeJ Aj, where each Aj stands for either Xj = true or Xj =false, then the post-action ranking II:A (wlC) is given by the formula
iflJ where R is the set of root nodes and if X;(w) =/; X;(w') and pai = 0 if X;(w) =/; X;(w'),pa; =/; 0 and (9) x: ( ...., � ;(w)jpa ; (w)) = 0 (10) otherwise S(w,w') represents persistence assumptions: It is sur prising (to degree s; � 1) to find X; change from its pre-action value of Xi(w') to a post-action value of Xi ( w) if there is no causal reason for the change.
If A is a disjunction of actions, A = V1 A1, where each A1 is a conjunction of atomic propositions, then
FROM UTILITIES AND BELIEFS
TO GOALS AND ACTIONS
Given a proposition r.p that describes some condition or event in the world, what information is needed before we can evaluate the merit of obtaining r.p, or, at the least, whether 1{>1 is "preferred" to 1{>2? Clearly, if we are to apply the expected utility criterion, we should define two measures on possible worlds, a probabil ity measure P(w) and a utility measure U(w). The first rates the likelihood that a world w will be real ized, while the second measures the desirability of w.
Unfortunately, probabilities and utilities in themselves are not sufficient for determining preferences among propositions. The merit of obtaining r.p depends on at least two other factors: how the truth of r.p is estab lished, and what control we possess over which model of r.p will eventually prevail. We will demonstrate the�e two factors by example.
Consider the proposition r.p = "The ground is wet". In the midst of a drought, the consequences of this state ment would depend critically on whether we watered the ground (action) or we happened to fi nd the ground wet (observation). Thus, the utility of a proposition r.p clearly depends on how we came to know r.p, by mere observation or by willful action. In the first case, find ing r.p true may provide information about the natural process that led to the observation r.p, and we should change the current probability from P(w) to P(wlr.p).
In the second case, our actions may perturb the natu ral flow of events, and P(w) will change without shed ding light on the typical causes of r.p. We will denote the probability resulting from externally enforcing the truth of r.p by Pcp(w), which will be further explicated in Section 5 in terms of the causal network r. 3
However, regardless of whether the probability func tion P(wjr.p) or Pcp(w) results from learning r.p, we are still unable to evaluate the merit of r.p unless we un derstand what control we have over the opportuni ties offered by r.p. Simply taking the expected utility U(r.p) = E w [P(wjr.p)U(w)] amounts to assuming that the agent is to remain totally passive until Nature se lects a world w with probability P( w jr.p), as in a game of chance. It ignores subsequent actions which the agent might be able to take so as to change this probability. For example, event r.p might provide tb.e agent with the option of conducting further tests so as to determine with greater certainty which world would eventually be realized. Likewise, in case r.p stands for "Joe went to get his gun" , our agent might possess the wisdom to protect itself by escaping in the next taxicab.
3The difference between P(wlrp) and P'l'(w) is precisely the difference between conditioning and "imaging" (Lewis 1973) , and between belief revision and belief update (Al chourron et.al. 1985 , Katsuno & Mendelzon 1991 , Gold szmidt & Pearl 1992 . It also accounts for the difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals -a topic of much philosophical discussion (Harper et.al. 1980 ).
In practical decision analysis the utility of being in a situation 'fi is computed using a dynamic programming approach, which assumes that subsequent to realizing 'fi the agent will select the optimal sequence of actions from those enabled by 'fl· This computation is rather exhaustive and is often governed by some form of my opic approximation (Chapter 6, Pearl 1988) . Ought statements normally refer to a single action A, tac itly assuming that the choice of subsequent actions, if available, is rather obvious and their consequences are well understood. We say, for example, "You ought to get some food", assuming that the food would subse quently be eaten and not be left to rot in the car. In our analysis, we will make a similar myopic approxi mation, assuming either that action A is terminal or that the consequences of subsequent actions (if avail able) are already embodied in the functions P(w) and t..t {w). We should keep in mind, however, that the re sult of this myopic approximation is not applicable to all actions; in sequential planning situations, some ac tions may be selected for the sole purpose of enabling certain subsequent actions.
Denote by P'(w) the probability function that would prevail after obtaining <p. 4 Let us examine next how the expected utility criterion U(<p) = �P'(w)U(w) translates into the language of ranking functions.
Let us assume that U takes on values in {-0(1/E), 0(1), +0(1/E)}, read as {very undesirable, bearable, very desirable}. For notational simplic ity, we can describe these linguistic labels as a util ity ranking function J.L(w) that takes on the values -1, 0, and +1, respectively. Our task, then, is to evaluate the rank J.L('fl), as dictated by the expected value of U(w) over the models of 'fi· Let the sets of worlds assigned the ranks -1, 0, and + 1 be represented by the formulas w-' W 0 ' and w + ' re spectively, and let the intersections of these sets with 'fi be represented by the formulas 'fl-, <p 0 , and 'fl+, respectively. The expected utility of 'fi is given by -C_jf P'(W-) + C0 P'(W0) + C + fE P'(W+), where C_, C0, and C + are some positive coefficients. Introducing now the infinitesimal approximation for P', in the form of the ranking function K1, we obtain
and
(12) The ambiguous status reflects a state of conflict U(<p) = -C_jf + C + fE, where there is a serious possi bility of ending in either terrible disaster or enormous success. Recognizing that ought statements are of ten intended to avert such situations (e.g., "You ought to invest in something safer"), we may take a risk averse attitude and rank ambiguous states as low as U = -0(1/E) (other attitudes are, of course, perfectly legitimate). This attitude, together with "'('fl) = 0, yields the desired expression for J.L( lfli K1 ( w)):
The three-level utility model is, of course, only a coarse rating of desirability. In a multi-level model, where W/ and W; -are the formulas whose models receive utility ranking +i and -i, respectively 5 , and i = 0, 1, 2, ... , the ranking of the expected utility of 'fi is given by Eq. (7) (Section 3).
Having derived a formula for the utility rank of an arbitrary proposition <p, we are now in a position to formulate our interpretation of the deontic expression O(AIC): "You ought to do A if C, iff the expected utility associated with doing A is much higher than that associated with not doing A". We start with a belief ranking K(w) and a utility ranking J.L(w), and we wish to assess the utilities associated with doing A versus not doing A, given that we observe C. The observation C would transform our current 1\(w) into K(w!C). Doing A would further transform K(w!C) into K1(w) = KA(w!C), while not doing A would ren der K(wiC) unaltered, so K1(w) = 1\(wiC). Thus, the utility rank associated with doing A is given by J.L(A; K�(w!C)), while that associated with not doing A is given by J.L(C; K(wiC)) = J.L(true; K(w!C). Con sequently, we can write the assertability criterion for conditional ought as O(AIC) iff J.L(A; KA(wiC)) > J.L(true; K(wiC)) (14) where the function J.L( 'Pi K(w)) is given in Eq. (13).
We remark that the transformation from K(wiC) to x:A(wiC) requires causal knowledge of the domain, which will be provided by the causal network r (Sec tion 5). Once we are given r it will be convenient to encode both K(w) and J.L(w) using integer-valued labels on the links of f. Moreover, it is straightforward to apply Eqs. (7) and (14) to the usual decision theo retic tasks of selecting an optimal action or an opti mal information-gathering strategy (Chapter 6, Pearl 1988).
To demonstrate the use of Eq. (14), let us examine the assertability of "If it is cloudy you ought to take an umbrella" (Boutilier 1993) . We assume three atomic propositions, c -"Cloudy", r -"Rain", and u -"Hav ing an Umbrella", which form eight worlds, each corre sponding to a complete truth assignment to c, r, and u. 51n practice, the specification of U ( w) is done 'by defin ing an integer-valued variable V (connoting "value" ) as a function of a select set of atomic variables. Wi would cor respond then to the assertion V = i, i = 0, 1, 2, ....
To express our belief that rain does not normally occur in a dear day, we assign a ,.. value of 1 (indicating one unit of surprise) to any world satisfying r 1\ -,c and a 11: value of 0 to all other worlds (indicating a serious possibility that any such world may be realized). To express the fear of fi nding ourselves in the rain with out an umbrella, we assign a I' value of -1 to worlds satisfying r 1\ -,u and a I' value of 0 to all other worlds. Thus, w+ = false, W0 = ..., (rf\-,u) , and w-= rf\-,u.
In this simple example, there is no difference between KA(w) and ��:(w!A) because the act A = "Taking an umbrella" has the same implications as the finding "Having an umbrella". Thus, to evaluate the two ex Note that although IC(w) does not assume that nor mally we do not hav� an umbrella with us ( IC ( u) > 0), the advice to take an umbrella is still assertable, since leaving u to pure chance might result in harsh conse quences (if it rains).
Using the same procedure, it is easy to show that the example also sanctions the assertability of 0( -,ric, -,u ), which stands for "If it is cloudy and you don't have an umbrella, then you ought to undo (or stop) the rain". This is certainly useless advice, as it does not take into account one's inability to control the weather. Con trollability information is not encoded in the ranking functions 11: and J.li it should be part of one's causal theory and can be encoded in the language of causal networks using costly preconditions that, until satis fied, would forbid the action do(A) from having any effect on A.6 5 COMBINING ACTIONS AND
OBSERVATIONS
In this section we develop a probabilistic account for the term ICA(w!C), which stands for the belief ranking 6In decision theory it is customary to attribute direct costs to actions, which renders tt(w) action-dependent. An alternative, which is more convenient when actions are not enumerated explicitly, is to attribute costs to precondi tions that must be satisfied before (any) action becomes effective. where paA (w) are the parents (or immediate causes) of A in the causal network r evaluated at w. The formula above was derived under the assumption that r is not loaded with any observations (e.g., C) and renders "A (w) undefi ned for worlds w that are excluded by previous observations and reinstated by A.
To motivate the proper transformation from IC(w) to ICA(w!C), we consider two causal networks, r' and r respectively representing the agent's epistemic states before and after the action (see Figure 1) . Although the structures of the two networks are almost the same (r contains additional root nodes representing the ac tion do(A)), it is the interactions between the corre sponding variables that determine which beliefs are going to persist in r and which are to be "clipped" by the influence of action A.
Let every variable Xi in f' be connected to the corre sponding variable X; in r by a directed link X I --+ X; that represents persistence by default, namely, the nat ural tendency of properties to persist, unless there is a cause for a change. Thus, the parent set of each X; in r has been augmented with one more variable: Xi.
To specify the conditional probability of X;, given its new parent set {pax; u xn, we need to balance the tendency of X; to persist (i.e., be equal to Xi) against its tendency to obey the causal influence exerted by pax;. We will assume that persistence forces yield to causal forces and will perpetuate only those properties that are not under any causal influence to terminate. In terms of ranking functions, this assumption reads:
��:(X;(w ) jpa ; (w), XI(w')) = { s; if pa; = 0 and X;(w) 'f= X;(w') s ; + ��:(X;(w)lpa , (w)) if X;(w) # x;( w ') and ��:(-,X;(w)jpa,(w)) = 0 ��:(X;(w)lpa;(w)) otherwise (17) where w' and w specify the truth values of the variables in the corresponding networks, f' and f, and Si 2: 1 is a constant characterizing the tendency of X; to persist. Eq. (17) states that the past value of X; may affect the normal relation between X; and its parents only when it differs from the current value and, at the same time, the parents of X; do not compel the change. In such a case, the inequality X;(w) =/= XHw') contributes s; units of surprise to the normal relation between X; and its parents.7 The unique feature of this model, unlike the one proposed in (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992) , is that persistence defaults can be violated by causal factors without forcing us to conclude that such factors are abnormal.
Eq. (17) specifies the conditional rank �e(XIpax) for every variable X in the combined networks and, hence, it provides a complete specification of the joint rank �e(w, w').8 The desired expression for the post-action ranking KA(w) can then be obtained by marginalizing �e(w,w') over w':
w '
We need, however, to account for the fact that some variables in network r are under the direct influence of the action A, and hence the parents of these nodes are replaced by the action node d o (A). If A con sists of a conjunction of atomic propositions, A = 1\j E J Aj, where each Aj stands for either Xj = true or Xj = false, then each X;, i E J, should be ex empt from incurring the spontaneity penalty speci fied in Eq. (17). Additionally, in calculating K(w, w ' ) we need to sum �e(X;(w)lpa ; (w), Xt(w')) only over The expressions, familiar in probability theory, Eq. (19) demonstrates that the effect of observations and actions can be computed as an updating opera tion on epistemic states, these states being organized by a fixed causal network, with the only varying el ement being �e, the belief ranking. Long streams of observations and actions could therefore be processed as a sequence of updates on some initial state, without requiring analysis of long chains of temporally indexed networks, as in Dean and Kanazawa (1989) .
To handle disjunctive actions such as "Paint the wall either red or blue" one must decide between two in terpretations: "Paint the wall red or blue regardless of its current color" or "Paint the wall either red or blue but, if possible, do not change its current color" (see Katsuno & Mendelzon 1991 and Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992 ). We will adopt the former interpretation, according to which "d o (A VB)" is merely a shorthand
". This interpretation is particu larly convenient for ranking systems, because for any two propositions, A and B, we have
Thus, if we do not know which action, A or B, will be implemented but consider either to be a serious possibility, then
Accordingly, if A is a disjunction of actions, A = V1 A1, where each A1 is a conjunction of atomic propo sitions, then
Example 2 To demonstrate the interplay between actions and ob servations, we will test the assertability of the following dialogue: Robot 1: It is too dark in here. Robot 2: Then you ought to push the switch up. Robot 1: The switch is already up. Robot 2: Then you ought to push the switch down.
The challenge would be to explain the reversal of the "ought" statement in response to the new observation "The switch is already up". The inferences involved in this example revolve around identifying the type of switch Robot 1 is facing, that is whether it is normal ( n ) or abnormal ( •n) (a normal switch is one that should be pushed up (u) to turn the light on(/)). The causal network, shown in Figure 2 , involves three vari ables:
P(w, w') =II P( X 3(w, w')ipa1(w, w')), P(w)
L-the current state of the light (I vs •I), translate into the ranking expressions S-the current position of the switch (u vs •u), and T -the type of switch at hand ( n vs •n).
��:(w, w') = L �( X J(w, w')) lpa j (w, w')), ��:(w) = � i ,n �(w, w') The variable L stands in functional relationship to S i and T, via where j ranges over all variables in the two networks.
or, equivalently, k = oo unless I satisfies the relation above.
Since initially the switch is believed to be normal, we set K( -.n) = 1, resulting in the following initial ranking: 
To evaluate KA(wjC) for A = u, we now invoke Eq.
(19), using the spontaneity functions
because L( w), being functionally determined by paL(w) is exempt from co!lforming to persistence de faults. Moreover, for action A = u we also have
for w = w1, w2
where I[p ] equals 1 (or 0) if pis true (or false), and
All other worlds are excluded by either A = u or C= -./.
Minimizing Eq. (19) over the two possible w' worlds, yields
KA(wjC)
{ 0 for w = w1
1 for w = w2
We see that w2 = u A -,n A -./ is penalized with one unit of surprise for exhibiting an unexplained change in switch type (initially believed to be normal).
It is worth noting how w1, which originally was ruled out (with K = oo) by the observation -./, is suddenly reinstated after taking the action A = u. In fact, Eq.
(19) first restores all worlds to their original K(w) value and then adjusts their value in three steps. First it excludes worlds satisfying -,A, then adjusts the K(w) of the remaining worlds by an amount K(AjpaA(w)), and finally makes an additional adjustment for violation of persistence.
From Eqs. (26) and (28) which, in turn, justifies the opposite "ought" state ment ("Then you ought to push the switch down").
Note that although finding a normal switch is less surprising than finding an abnormal switch, a spon taneous transition to such a state would violate per sistence and is therefore penalized by obtaining a K of 1. 
DEONTIC AND PREFERENCE LOGICS
Ought statements of the pragmatic variety have been investigated in two branches of philosophy, deontic logic and preference logic. Surprisingly, despite an intense effort to establish a satisfactory account of "ought" statements (Von Wright 1963 , Van Fraassen 1973 , Lewis 1973 , the literature of both logics is loaded with paradoxes and voids of principle. This raises the question of whether "ought" statements are destined to forever elude formalization or that the approach taken by deontic logicians has been misdi rected. I believe the answer involves a combination of both.
Philososphers hoped to develop deontic logic as a sep arate branch of conditional logic, not as a synthetic amalgam of logics of belief, action, and causation. In other words, they have attempted to capture the meaning of "ought" using a single modal operator 0( · ), instead of exploring the couplings between "ought" and other modalities, such as belief, action, causation, and desire. The present paper shows that such an isolationistic strategy has little chance of succeeding. Whereas one can perhaps get by without explicit refer ence to desire, it is absolutely necessary to have both probabilistic knowledge about the effect of observa tions on the likelihood of events and causal knowledge about actions and their consequences.
We have seen in Section 3 that to ratify the sentence "Given C, you ought to do A", we need to know not merely the relative desirability of the worlds delineated by the propositions A 1\ C and -.A 1\ C, but also the feasibility or likelihood of reaching any one of those worlds in the future, after making our choice of A. We also saw that this likelihood depends critically on how C is confirmed, by observation or by action. Since this information cannot be obtained from the logical con tent of A and C, it is not surprising that "almost ev ery principle which has been proposed as fundamental to a preference logic has been rejected by some other source" {Mullen 1979).
In fact, the decision theoretic account embodied in Eq. {14) can be used to generate counterexamples to most of the principles suggested in the literature, simply by selecting a combination of "'• JJ, and r that defi es the proposed principle. Since any such principle must be valid in all epistemic states and since we have enor mous freedom in choosing these three components, it is not surprising that only weak principles, such as O (A JC) =:::} -.0(-.AJC), survive the test. Among the few that do survive, we fi nd the sure-thing principle:
read as "If you ought to doA given C and you ought to do A given -.C, then you ought to do A without examining C". But one begins to wonder about the value of assembling a logic from a sparse collection of such impoverished survivors when, in practice, a fu ll specifi cation of,, '"' ' and r would be required.
6.2

COUNTERFACTU AL CONDITION ALS
Stalnaker {1972) was the first to make the connection between actions and counterfactual statements, and he proposed using the probability of the counterfactual conditional (as opposed to the conditional probability, which is more appropriate for indicative conditionals) in the calculation of expected utilities. Stalnaker's the ory does not provide an explicit connection between subjunctive conditionals and causation, however. Al though the selection function used in the Stalnaker Lewis nearest-world semantics can be thought of as a generalization of, and a surrogate for, causal knowl edge, it is too general, as it is not constrained by the basic features of causal relationships such as asym metry, transitivity, and complicity with temporal or der. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no attempt to translate causal sentences into specifica tions of the Stalnaker-Lewis selection function.9 Such specifications were partially provided in ( Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992) , through the imaging function w*(w), and are further refi ned in this paper by invoking the persistence model {Eq. {19)). Note that a directed acyclic graph is the only ingredient one needs to add to the traditional notion of epistemic state so as to specify a causality-based selection function.
From this vantage point, our calculus provides, in essence, a new account of subjunctive conditionals that is more reflective of those used in decision making. The account is based on giving the subjunctive the follow ing causal interpretation: "Given C, if I were to per form A, then I believe B would come about", written A > BJC, which in the language of ranking function reads K{-.BJC) = 0 and "-A(-.BJC) > 0
The equality states that -.B is considered a serious possibility prior to performing A, while the inequal ity renders -.B surprising after performing A. This account, which we call Decision Making Conditionals (DMC), avoids several paradoxes of conditional log ics (see Nute 1992) and is further described in (Pearl 1993) .
6.3
OTHER DECISION THEOR ETIC ACCOUNTS Poole (1992) has proposed a quantitative decision theoretic account of defaults, taking the utility of A, given evidence e, to be JJ(AJe) = :E w JJ(w,A)P(wJe)
This requires a specification of an action-dependent preference function for each (w, A) pair. Our proposal (in line with (Stalnaker 1972) ) attributes the depen dence of 1-' on A to beliefs about the possible conse quences of A, thereby keeping the utility of each conse quence constant. In this way, we see more clearly how the structure of causal theories should affect the choice of actions. For example, suppose A and e are incom patible ("If the light is on (e) , turn it off (A)"), taking (34) literally (without introducing temporal indices) would yield absurd results. Additionally, Poole's is a calculus of incremental improvements of utility, while 9Gibbard and Harper (Gibbard & Harper 1980 ) develop a quantitative theory of rational decisions that is based on Stalnaker's suggestion and explicitly attributes causal character to counterfactual conditionals. However, they assume that probabilities of counterfactuals are given in advance and do not specify either how such probabilities are encoded or how they relate to probabilities of ordinary propositions. Likewise, a criterion for accepting a counter factual conditional, given other counterfactuals and other propositions, is not provided.
ours is concerned with substantial improvements, as is typical of ought statements. Boutilier (1993) has developed a modal logic account of conditional goals which embodies considerations similar to ours. It remains to be seen whether causal relationships such as those governing the interplay among actions and observations can easily be encoded into his formalism.
CONCLUSION
By pursuing the semantics of ought statements this pa per develops an account of qualitative decision theory and a framework for qualitative planning under uncer tainty. The two main features of this account are: 1. Order-of-magnitude specifications of probabilities and utilities are combined to produce qualitative ex pected utilities of actions and consequences, condi tioned on observations (Eq. (7)). 2. A single causal network, combined with universal assumptions of persistence is sufficient for specifying the dynamics of beliefs under any sequence of actions and observations (Eq. (9)).
